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JURISDICTION' 
This appeal is from, a final judgment of the Sixth 
• Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah, 
tL- .-_:. . :. .-. „ .-. ")wer presiding, entered November 22, :i 994 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (k) and pi irsuant to the order of the 
Utah Supreme Court dated March 3] , 1995, transferring this matter 
from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
.' STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
S T A T E M E N T 0 F ISSUES 
Hansens do not dispute Obergs' statement of i ssues 
insofar as they relate to Obergs' challenge to Judge Mower's 
Findings of Fact As discussed more fully below, however, Hansens 
disagree with Obergs' claim that their appeal raises issues of law 
for disposition by this Court. 
In addition, the content of Obergs' brief has given rise 
to another issue: Whether Obergs have marshalled the evidence in 
support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact, as required by Rule 
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case law decided 
thereunder. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 
The standard of review is governed by Rule 52 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part, "Findings of 
Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." The "clearly erroneous" standard applies whether 
the case is one in equity or one at law. Barker v. Francis, 741 
P.2d 548 (Ut. App. 1987). 
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, granting no particular deference. Carter v. Hanrath, 
885 P.2d 801 (Ut. App. 1994). 
Issue No, 2 
The reviewing court will affirm the trial court's ruling 
"absent an abuse of discretion". Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 
and if proper "will affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse 
of discretion". Baldwin v. Burton, supra, at 1198. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATION 
Regarding issue of boundary by acquiescence and Defendants' 
challenges to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact: 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in 
relevant part: 
Findings of Fact . . . shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the Trial Court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Regarding the award of attorney's fees: 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2) . 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may 
award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an 
affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record 
the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below 
This case presents a simple contest between Plaintiffs, 
Walter Scott Hansen and Kristi D. Hansen (hereinafter referred to 
as "Hansens"), who claim title to real property by their deed, 
title of record and possession, and Defendants, Craig Oberg and 
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Diane Oberg (hereinafter referred to as "Obergs"), who claim title 
under a theory of boundary by acquiescence. 
A two-day trial was held before the Honorable Judge 
David L. Mower, who entered oral findings from the bench and then 
took the matter under advisement (Tr. 453, 463). 
The Court issued its Findings of Fact and Decision on or 
about September 21, 1994, and directed Hansens" attorney to prepare 
a Judgment and Order that would conform to its decision (R. 181). 
The Court ruled in Hansens' favor and found that Obergs 
had promised to move the fence in the future when the Hansens 
developed their property (R. 179, 196), that there never was a 
boundary between the parties' property that met the requirements 
under a theory of boundary by acquiescence (R. 197) , that the 
Obergs had trespassed upon the Hansens' property (R. 197), and that 
the Hansens were entitled to an award of attorney's fees (R. 180, 
181 and 198). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Introduction 
Hansens take issue with Obergs' statement of facts. It 
is misleading because it is very selective and omits much of the 
evidence at trial that is pertinent to the findings of fact they 
challenge. Obergs have completely failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact, as required under 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirement to 
marshal the evidence is discussed more fully in the "Argument" 
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section below. Obergs' statement of facts is thus nothing more 
than a recital of the evidence that Obergs believe would support 
their claim against Hansens. 
While Obergs' failure to marshal the evidence is 
sufficient by itself to warrant dismissal of this appeal, Hansens 
will nonetheless set forth below a summary of the ample evidence 
that supports Judge Mower's Decision and the Findings of Fact. 
Hansens have summarized the facts and have also summarized the 
pertinent testimony of each witness who testified at trial. To 
assist the Court, the witnesses and their roles are identified 
briefly below. 
Witness or Party 
Walter Scott Hansen 
Oscar Deloy Peterson 
Jack L. Peterson 
Steve L. Ludlow 
Thomas LaVeal Hansen 
Merrill Ogden 
Craig Oberg 
Robert Sevy 
Earl Livinston 
Ted Peterson 
Role 
Plaintiff, current owner of 
Parcel 107 
Prior owner of parcel 107 
Prior owner of parcel 107 
Surveyor 
Plaintiff s father 
Abstractor 
Defendant, current owner of 
parcel 105 
Prior owner of parcel 107 
Employee of Defendant 
who built fence 
Neighbor of Defendant who has 
lived near parcels 105 and 107 
since 1948 
Don Christensen Defendant's father-in-law 
Wayne Sevy Prior owner of Lot 107 
B. Summary of Testimony 
The testimony of the trial witnesses is summarized below. 
This summary is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of all 
the testimony, but rather a summary of the evidence that supports 
Judge Mower's Findings of Fact. As such, it constitutes the 
"marshalling of the evidence" that Obergs should have incorporated 
in their brief. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the Findings 
of Fact and the judgment in Hansens' favor. 
Walter Scott Hansen 
Walter Hansen, a Plaintiff in this action, purchased 
parcel 107 from Jack Lou Peterson, etux, in August of 1990. 
After he purchased the property, he improved the property 
and placed a mobile home where he, his wife and four children live. 
(Tr. 15-16) .x 
At the time Hansen purchased the property, Peterson 
showed him the southernmost boundary as beginning in the middle of 
Cottonwood Creek and running directly west. The old fence was on 
the north side of the creek, was in disrepair and was overgrown 
with a lot of foliage. (Tr. 16-17). 
Oberg called Hansen two days after he moved into his 
mobile home in August of 1990 and asked him if he was interested in 
References to the record other than the trial transcript will 
be referred to herein as R. , indicating the page number of the 
record. References to the trial transcript will be referred to as 
Tr. , indicating the page number of the transcript. 
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selling the now disputed property, to which Hansen replied in the 
negative. During this conversation with Oberg, there was no 
discussion concerning the old fence nor did Oberg make any claim of 
entitlement to or ownership of the disputed property, although 
Hansen told Oberg of how Peterson had identified the boundary. 
(Tr. 18-19). 
Hansen had another conversation, in May of 1991, after 
Obergs' horse had trampled Hansens' newly planted grass. They 
discussed putting up a fence together, and again Oberg made no 
claim to the disputed property. (Tr. 20-21). 
In March or April of 1992, Oberg built an irrigation pond 
50-70 yards to the northwest of Hansens' parcel 107. Hansen 
complained to Oberg about the pond concerning safety issues with 
his children and other neighborhood children. Oberg responded by 
building a fence around his pond but stopped at the northwest 
corner of Hansens' parcel 107. (Tr. 29-32). 
Hansen stated that his children played on both sides of 
the old fence and built huts and little play areas from the time he 
moved in, in August of 1990 to August of 1992. Oberg never stopped 
them or complained they were on his property. (Tr. 34 and 35). 
In August of 1992, while Hansen was away to the Utah 
National Guard Summer Camp, Oberg had his employees build the fence 
that ran more or less where the old fence had been. (Tr. 35). 
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Hansen did not recall ever seeing Oberg do any repairs to 
the old fence prior to the construction of the new fence. 
(Tr. 34). 
Oberg and Hansen had a conversation in August of 1993, 
after this lawsuit was filed, and Oberg said he would move the 
fence when Hansen was ready to develop his property. (Tr. 36-38) . 
Oscar Delov Peterson 
Oscar Peterson testified that he purchased parcel 107 in 
April of 1980 from Robert Sevy. Mr. Sevy took him to the property 
with his brother Jack Peterson. Mr. Sevy showed him the southern-
most boundary line to be on the south side of Cottonwood Creek and 
identified the fence line which Obergs claim to be the boundary by 
acquiescence as "the pig fence that we put up." (Tr. 46-52). 
Mr. Peterson stated that there was not much of a fence 
and that during the three years that he owned the property he never 
saw Oberg do any repairs to the fence, nor did Oberg ever make a 
claim to the property. (Tr. 49, 52 and 61) . Peterson always 
considered the boundary of the property to be where Robert Sevy had 
showed him, not the old fence. (Tr. 57). During his ownership, 
Mr. Peterson chased children off the disputed parcel, cut a rope 
out of a tree on the parcel, and pruned the trees thereon. (Tr. 
55) . He used the disputed property "no more than the rest of the 
property that I'd bought." (Tr. 58). 
Just before Mr. Peterson sold parcel 107 to his brother, 
he recalled Oberg putting up a fence on the south side of 
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Cottonwood Creek, made of green posts and wire on the approximate 
boundary line that Mr. Sevy had shown to him when he purchased the 
property. (Tr. 52-56, and see Exhibit #25). 
Mr. Peterson recalls Oberg putting horses on parcel 105 
but that the horses were tethered to a stake by a rope. (Tr. 58) . 
Jack Lou Peterson 
Jack Peterson is the brother of Oscar Deloy Peterson, and 
he purchased parcel 107 from Oscar in 1983. 
Mr. Peterson remembers going to the property with 
Mr. Robert Sevy when his brother purchased the property and 
recalled the boundaries described as Oscar Peterson testified. He 
understood the boundary with parcel 105 was south of the creek. 
(Tr. 80-81) . 
Peterson testified that Oberg had a fence built on the 
south side of Cottonwood Creek that was constraining livestock 
Oberg had on parcel 105. The fence Oberg had on parcel 105 was on 
the approximate boundary line as had been described by Mr. Sevy. 
(Tr. 81 and 82). 
Peterson recalls Oberg placing "No Trespassing" signs on 
fences around parcel 105 but not on the old fence. (Tr. 85 and 
88) . 
Steve Ludlow 
Steve Ludlow is a registered engineer and land surveyor 
who surveyed parcels 105 and 107, marked as Exhibit #26, in June, 
1992. (Tr. 101, 104). 
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Ludlow testified that he found no gaps or overlaps for 
parcels 105 and 107 and that the deeded descriptions matched up 
with what he found on the ground pursuant to his survey. (Tr. 99-
101 and 117). 
Ludlow described the disputed property as having a 
considerable amount of over-growth and saw no older fence. (Tr. 
118 and 121). 
Ludlow measured 99.74 feet inside Oberg's fences whereas 
his deeded description called for 66 feet. (Tr. 120). 
Thomas LaVeal Hansen 
Tom Hansen is the father of the Plaintiff, has lived in 
Ephraim for 57 years (Tr. 137) , and owns a business across the 
street south from the subject parcels. 
Mr. Tom Hansen recalled the conversation between Oberg 
and his son in August of 1990 at which time Oberg pointed out the 
boundary line and made no claim to the disputed property. (Tr. 143 
and 144). 
Mr. Hansen testified that the Plaintiff, Kristi Hansen, 
called him to help her get Oberg's men off their property, i.e., 
make them stop building the new fence and quit cutting down the 
trees. (Tr. 146, 159) . 
Mr. Hansen and his other son, Kenny, took pictures of the 
damage done to the property and of the new fence. (Tr. 147-159) . 
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Merrill Ogden 
Merrill Ogden is a registered abstractor and licensed 
title insurance agent in the State of Utah. 
Ogden testified that he ran a title search on the 
property back fifty years and found no overlapping descriptions or 
gaps on the property. (Tr. 177). 
Ogden found that parcels 105 and 107 were commonly owned 
from the 1950's until March of 1970, when Hespert Sevy deeded 
parcel 107 to his son, Kenneth Sevy. (Tr. 178, 187). 
Ogden found a Decree Quieting Title marked as Exhibit 27 
for parcel 105. (Tr. 178-183). 
Parcels 105 and 107 have had distinct and separate legal 
descriptions since 1877. 
Craig Oberg 
Craig Oberg is a Defendant and purchased the property in 
1977 from Kenneth Sevy and moved to Ephraim in 1978. (Tr. 194 and 
195) . 
Oberg testified there was an old fence on the disputed 
area that "wasn't all that great" and that there was a lot of 
growth and vegetation on the old fence. (Tr. 216, 221). 
Oberg testified that when his employees built the new 
fence on Hansens' property they removed a lot of trees and bushes. 
(Tr. 241) . 
Oberg testified that he thought Beck had built the fence. 
(Tr. 245). 
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Oberg testified that he, like everybody else, does not 
know why the old fence was placed in its location. (Tr. 271 and 
272) . 
Oberg testified that he has never told anybody that the 
disputed property was his. (Tr. 272 and 273). 
Oberg testified that he will lose no ground if the Court 
decides the boundary is the survey line and that the ground has no 
monetary value to him. (Tr. 276 and 277). 
Oberg agreed that he had discussed the option to move the 
fence he had constructed on Hansens' property at a later date. 
(Tr. 278 and 279) . 
It should be noted that Obergs cite Tr. 282 as Craig 
Oberg's testimony that he believed he was constructing the new 
fence on the property line. There is no such testimony on that 
page or any nearby page. 
Robert Sevy 
Robert Sevy is a prior owner of parcel 107. He received 
the property from his father, Hespert Sevy, who also owned parcel 
105 at the time. (Tr. 292 and 293) . 
Robert Sevy testified that he did not care where the 
fence was because his family owned the other parcel 105. (Tr. 297 
and 298) . Obergs cite Tr. 291 as support for the claim that Robert 
Sevy understood the old fence was the boundary. The actual 
testimony is far less certain, as follows: 
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Q What did you understand the south and 
west boundaries to be when you were given the 
property? 
A Well, I never really thought about it 
until this come up, and I just always figured 
the fence line was -- I never had any worry 
about it. . . . 
Q So was it your opinion during the time 
that you owned that piece of ground, parcel 
107, that the fence constituted the boundary 
line? 
A I never even thought about it. I just 
knew there was a fence there. (Tr. 291-292) . 
Sevy testified that he sold the property by the deed to 
Oscar Deloy Peterson. (Tr. 2 98) . Mr. Sevy made no mention of the 
fence during the sales transaction. 
Sevy testified that he built pig pens on parcel 107 and 
watered the pigs out of Cottonwood Creek on the other side of the 
old fence. (Tr. 300 and 301). 
Sevy testified that when his father owned both parcels 
105 and 107 that the farm animals could roam over both parcels at 
will because the fence had not been repaired. (Tr. 301-302) . 
Sevy testified that the predecessors in interest (Beck 
and Sevy) who owned both parcels repaired the fence to keep 
livestock away from Mrs. Beck's house. (Tr. 303 and 304). 
Further, that after Mrs. Beck died, the fence was not repaired and 
his father, Hespert Sevy, a predecessor in title to both parcel 105 
and 107, let his livestock roam at will over both parcels. (Tr. 
316, 319). 
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Earl Livinston 
Oberg's employee who built the new fence on the Hansen 
property. Livinston testified that Plaintiff's father, Tom Hansen, 
told them they were trespassing and to quit building the fence. 
(Trial Transcript and 322-323). 
Livinston testified that when they began to build the new 
fence, that the old fence was in disrepair and in pretty bad shape. 
(Tr. 324) . 
Livinston testified that they had to cut down two trees 
on Hansens' property in order to build the new fence. (Tr. 329). 
Ted Peterson 
Neighbor of Oberg who has lived on the same street as 
subject property since 1948. 
Has cleaned Cottonwood Creek and utilized water shares 
out of the creek. (Tr. 341). 
Peterson testified that he observed livestock wandering 
over parcels 105 and 107 while it was owned by Hespert Sevy that 
the livestock could roam and use the whole piece. (Tr. 348). 
Peterson testified that when he cleaned Cottonwood Creek 
in the 1940's and 50's the fence between parcels 105 and 107 was a 
worn out, torn down fence and poorly maintained. (Tr. 3 51 and 
352) . 
Don Christensen 
Father-in-law to Oberg. Lived in Ephraim 73 years and 
personally knew the Becks and the Sevys. 
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Testified that Becks and Sevys pastured animals on both 
parcels 105 and 107 and that they had fences and gates that they 
moved around. (Tr. 386-387). 
Wayne Sew 
Son of Hespert Sevy and brother to Robert Sevy, 
predecessors in title to disputed ground. Testified he built hog 
pens on parcel 107 and watered the pigs out of Cottonwood Creek. 
(Tr. 396). 
Testified does not even recall a fence when he raised 
pigs there in 1977, the same year the Obergs purchased the 
property. (Tr. 399). 
Testified that when his father owned both parcels 105 and 
107, the livestock were free to roam over the entire parcels. (Tr. 
400) . 
Testified he never saw anyone do any repairs to the 
fence. (Tr. 401). 
Further, was not even sure there was a fence. (Tr. 402) . 
Kristi Hansen 
A plaintiff in this action. Testified that fence was in 
total disrepair and children would play there and that the Obergs 
never complained about the children being there. (Tr. 413). 
C. Facts 
1. Plaintiffs reside in Ephraim, Utah, and are 
adjoining neighbors to Defendants. (R. 191-192). 
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2. Defendants acquired their property in March 1976 
from Kenneth M. Sevy and Sylvia L. Sevy by Warranty Deed dated 
April 29, 1976, and recorded February 23, 1977, in the official 
records of the Sanpete County Recorder. The real property conveyed 
by said deed is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West from the 
Southwest corner of Block 30, Plat "A" Ephraim 
City Survey, and running thence North 1.00 
chain; thence West 1.58 chains; thence North 
17 degrees 15 minutes West 7.40 chains; thence 
North 64 degrees 3 0 minutes West 2.10 chains; 
thence South 69 degrees West 1.15 chains; 
thence South 3 0 degrees East 1.90 chains; 
thence North 78 degrees 30 minutes East 0.92 
of a chain; thence South 14 degrees East 2.58 
chains; thence South 60 degrees East 0.90 of a 
chain; thence South 3.80 chains; thence East 
3.50 chains to the point of beginning. 
Said property is also identified in the records of the 
Sanpete County Recorder as parcel 105, Plat "A", Ephraim City 
Survey (R. 191, Exhibit 2) . 
3. Plaintiffs acquired their property by Warranty Deed 
from Jack Lou Peterson and Kris W. Peterson, dated August 8, 1990, 
recorded August 8, 1990, in the official records of the Sanpete 
County Recorder. The real property described in the deed received 
by Plaintiffs is set forth below: 
Beginning at a point 1.0 0 chain West and 1.0 0 
chain North from the Southwest corner of Block 
30, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey, and running 
thence West 1.58 chains; thence North 17 
degrees 15 minutes West 3.3 0 chains; thence 
East 2.62 chains, more or less; thence South 
3.2 9 chains to the point of beginning. 
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The foregoing parcel is also identified in the official 
records of the Sanpete County Recorder as a part of Parcel 107, 
Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey. (Hereinafter referred to as parcel 
107). (R. 191, Exhibit 14). 
4. The above described parcels are contiguous to each 
other and share a common boundary. The first call of Hansens' 
legal description (West 1.58 chains) is common to the second call 
of Obergs' legal description. The second call of Hansens' legal 
description is, in part, common to the third call of the Obergs' 
legal description. (R. 174, 175) . 
5. There is a natural water course running through 
Ephraim City known as Cottonwood Creek that crosses the two common 
boundary lines between the parties' property so that a portion of 
it runs through the area enclosed within Hansens' legal description 
and a portion runs through the area enclosed within Obergs' legal 
description (R. 174 and 192). 
6. Hansens' predecessors in interest to parcel 107 
after 1954 were as follows: 
Owner Dates of Ownership 
Madonna P. Beck 1954-1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963-1970 
Robert P. Sevy 1970-1980 
Oscar D. Peterson 1980-1983 
Jack L. Peterson 1983-1990 
7. Obergs' predecessors in interest to parcel 105 after 
1954 were as follows: 
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Owner Dates of Ownership 
Madonna Beck 1958-1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963-1971 
Rosella P. Sevy 1971-1973 
Kenneth M. Sevy 1976-1976 
8. Parcels 105 and 107 were under common ownership from 
November 1958 when Madonna Beck owned both parcels until March 
1970, when F. Hespert Sevy conveyed parcel 107 to his son Robert P. 
Sevy (R. 193, Tr. 185, 187). 
9. Parcel 107 was not used for residential purposes by 
any of Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest listed in paragraph 7 
above. Plaintiffs were the first to use parcel 107 for residential 
purposes (R. 194). 
10. Jack Peterson sold parcel 107 to Plaintiffs in 
August 1990. (R. 193, Tr. 15, Exhibit 14). 
11. The parties' respective properties were never part 
of a large parcel of ground but have existed as separate 
descriptions/parcels for at least fifty (50) years. (Tr. 184). 
12. The parties' respective properties were under common 
ownership from at least the 1950's until F. Hespert Sevy conveyed 
the Hansen property to his son Robert P. Sevy in March of 1970. 
(R. 193, Tr. 185, 187). 
13. The parties' predecessors in interest, Madonna Beck 
and F. Hespert Sevy, during their separate periods of ownership, 
used parcels 105 and 107 together to graze and raise livestock. 
(R. 176, 194, Tr. 301). 
-18-
14. At some time in the past, on a date that is unknown, 
a fence was constructed that ran basically parallel to Cottonwood 
Creek and which was located on parcel 107 and on the North side of 
Cottonwood Creek (where it runs East and West) and also on the east 
side of Cottonwood Creek (where it runs North and South). (R. 176 
and 194) . 
15. The parties' predecessors in interest to both 
parcels 105 and 107 did not treat the fence as a boundary fence 
(Tr. 297, 298, 400, 304, 315, 316 and 431). 
16. The only repairs to the fence by the parties' 
predecessors in interest was for the purpose of livestock control 
(Tr. 304, 82, 83, 92, 95, 56, 58). 
17. No one did any repairs to the fence from at least 
1977 to 1990 (Tr. 92, 52, 56, 316, 401). 
18. In 1977 when the Obergs purchased their parcel 105, 
the fence was in disrepair. (R. 176 and Tr. 399, 402 and 403) . In 
fact, Robert Sevy's brother, Wayne, raised pigs on the Hansen 
property and watered them out of Cottonwood Creek and does not 
recall a fence at all. (R. 177, 194 and Tr. 399, 402 and 403). 
19. The fence was still in disrepair in 1990 when the 
Hansens purchased their property. (R. 177). 
20. Oscar Deloy Peterson sold the property to his 
brother, Jack Lou Peterson, by the deed, and showed him the 
property line on the South side of Cottonwood Creek and not the old 
fence line. (Tr. 46 through 52). 
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21. Jack Lou Peterson sold parcel 107 to the Hansens by 
the deed and showed Mr. Hansen where the boundary line was south of 
Cottonwood Creek and not the old fence line (Tr. 16 and 17). 
22. The Obergs built a fence entirely on their north 
deeded property line and located south across the Creek from the 
old fence about 1983. They later took the fence down (Tr. 54, 55, 
56, 81, 82) . 
23. Madonna P. Beck and the Obergs used parcel 105 for 
residential purpose. (R. 177 and 194). 
24. The Hansens were the first owners listed herein to 
use parcel 107 for residential purposes. (R. 177 and 197). 
25. From the time the Hansens purchased the property in 
1990 and moved a trailer on the property and up to 1992, the Hansen 
children occupied those portions of parcel 107 and 105 in the area 
of Cottonwood Creek and used that area for operation of ATV's and 
for play activities. (R. 177 and 195). 
26. Oberg put "No Trespassing" signs on his fences 
during the time Jack Lou Peterson owned parcel 107 but he never put 
any signs on the old fence on parcel 105. (Tr. 85, 88-91) . 
27. Oberg offered to purchase the disputed portion of 
parcel 107 from the Hansens, at which time the parties' discussed 
a survey and Oberg made no claim that the old fence was the 
boundary. (Tr. 19-20) . 
28. While Mr. Hansen was out of town in June of 1992 for 
two (2) weeks to the Utah National Guard Summer Camp, Oberg had his 
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employees build a new fence in approximately the same location as 
the old fence, on the Hansen parcel 107. (Record 178 and 179, 195 
and 196). 
29. In June of 1992, Mr. Hansen's father, Thomas Hansen, 
appeared at the property when Obergs' employees were starting the 
construction of the new fence and asked them to stop. (R. 179, 
196) . 
30. In August of 1992, Mr. Oberg claimed the boundary 
between parcels 105 and 107 is Cottonwood Creek and that he, Mr. 
Oberg, would move the fence in the future as Hansens developed 
their property. (R. 179, 197). 
31. In March of 1992, Oberg built an irrigation pond 
that is Northwest of the Hansen property and not close to the 
property in dispute. (Tr. 22, 29-33). 
32. In November of 1992, Hansens' counsel sent Oberg a 
letter asking Mr. Oberg to vacate the Hansens' property, dismantle 
the fence and desist from any further interference. (R. 180, 197) . 
33. The new fence still stood on August 3, 1994. (R. 
180, 197) . 
34. There has never been a boundary between parcels 105 
and 107 that qualified as a boundary by acquiescence. (R. 180 and 
197) . 
35. To the extent that there may have been a fence or 
any other boundary between parcels 105 and 107, neither party has 
acquiescenced in the monument as a boundary and Mr. Oberg built a 
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fence between 1977 and 1983 that would interrupt any period of 
acquiescence. (Tr. 423, 432 and 454) . 
36. The Obergs have trespassed on the Hansens' property, 
and the Hansens have employed the only means available to them to 
prevent the continued trespass. That means is this lawsuit. (R. 
180, 197). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The primary reason that Obergs' appeal should be rejected 
is that they have failed to marshal the evidence as required by 
Rule 52(a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case law decided 
thereunder. Obergs' brief consists of nothing more than a 
recitation of the evidence that Obergs believe supports their 
arguments. Obergs have made no effort whatsoever to set forth the 
evidence that supports Judge Mower's Findings of Fact. This 
deficiency alone is sufficient to warrant denial of Obergs' appeal. 
Hansen has marshalled the evidence in support of Judge 
Mower's Findings of Fact. The facts overwhelmingly support Judge 
Mower's findings. 
With respect to Obergs' claim that there was acquiescence 
in the old fence by the parties and their respective predecessors 
in title, the witnesses uniformly testified that the fence was in 
total disrepair by 1977, when the Defendants purchased parcel 105. 
The witnesses that owned the property prLor to the parties 
testified that they did not care about the location of the fence or 
the boundaries and the predecessors in title permitted their 
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livestock to roam freely upon both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' 
ground. There simply was no testimony or evidence to support 
Obergs' claim that there was acceptance of the fence as a boundary. 
The disputed property was commonly owned from at least 
1958 to 1970 when Hespert Sevy deed the parcel 107 to his son 
Robert Sevy. Even then, Mr. Sevy did not care where the boundary 
was nor was the old fence accepted as the boundary because the 
livestock were free to roam the entire area, and his family owned 
the adjoining property. 
Obergs purchased parcel 105 in 1977 from another son of 
Hespert Sevy, Kenneth Sevy. Mr. Oberg claimed he used the part of 
parcel 107 up to the old fence line during his ownership by 
allowing his horses to chew down the grass there. However, two of 
the predecessors in title recall Oberg placing a fence upon what 
they believed to be the true boundary and deeded line sometime in 
1983. Mr. Oberg showed he knew and accepted the true boundary by 
his conversations with Mr. Hansen. Mr. Oberg never regarded the 
old fence as the property line, so he wants to rely solely on his 
predecessors in title to show the long time of acquiescence to a 
boundary it was his burden to establish. There was simply no 
testimony from any of the witnesses as to the purpose, use or 
intent of the fence prior to 1954. From 1954 to 1977 the fence was 
not recognized as a fence, let alone a boundary. 
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Finally, Judge Mower, as a trial court judge, had 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney's fees when 
he deemed it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 does not require written 
findings on the bad faith issue. In fact, if the Court finds bad 
faith and no merit to the actions of the losing party, the Court 
then has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party. Judge Mower substantively found that Obergs' 
action was without merit and their defense was in bad faith. There 
is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate the basis of Judge 
Mower's award of attorney's fee. Mr. Oberg had built his first 
fence on his deeded boundary line, took it down and then had his 
employees trespass upon Hansens' property while Mr. Hansen was away 
and build a fence upon Hansens' ground. Oberg dug holes, tore down 
trees and removed bushes and other vegetation as he trespassed upon 
Hansens' property. Mr. Hansen asked Oberg to quit trespassing and 
doing damage to his property, but Oberg refused to even discuss the 
matter and directed his employees to continue the construction of 
the fence. 
Mr. Hansen had his counsel write a letter to Oberg asking 
him to remove the fence he had wrongfully built upon the 
Plaintiffs' property. Mr. Oberg refused. 
Judge Mower presided over this lawsuit from beginning to 
end and had an opportunity to view and judge the credibility of the 
witnesses and the evidence. Based thereon, Judge Mower awarded 
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attorney's fees. Such an award of attorney's fees is appropriate 
for public policy reasons in that the law and the courts need some 
means to make the Plaintiff whole when they suffer damages 
inflicted by actions such as Obergs' . The Obergs should not be 
allowed to trespass upon anyone's property at will, destroy trees 
or build fences, thinking that they will be shielded from having to 
pay the total cost of making the victim of their actions whole. 
Attorney's fees are part of the damages suffered by the prevailing 
party, they cannot be made whole without recovery of those fees. 
Actions by others similarly situated to the Obergs' need to be 
discouraged and an award of attorney's fees should be affirmed as 
a signal to others that bad faith litigation is a burden on both 
courts and prevailing parties and the costs of such action will be 
borne by the bad faith litigant. 
Argument 
I. Obergs' Challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact Should be 
Rejected Because Obergs have Failed to Marshal the Evidence in 
Support of the Findings of Fact. 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Obergs' 
challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact will fail unless they 
can establish that the findings are "clearly erroneous". In order 
to meet this burden, Obergs are required to marshal the evidence in 
support of Judge Mower's Findings of Fact and demonstrate that 
despite the supporting evidence, the findings are clearly 
erroneous. Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
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1193, 1197 (Ut. App. 1991); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Ut. App. 1989). 
Obergs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the findings as required. Obergs' brief simply reargues the 
evidence that Obergs believe supports their view of the case. 
This Court recently stated how carefully appellants must 
marshal evidence and why appellate courts will not give a moment of 
consideration to those who do not. 
Utah appellate courts do not take courts' 
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have 
set forth the heavy burden appellants must 
bear when challenging factual findings. To 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings 
of fact, appellate counsel must play the 
devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate 
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshaling duty]... 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists." 
Oneida v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Ut. App. 1994) (emphasis added; emphasis of "supports" in 
original; extensive citations omitted). 
The Oneida court also articulated the appellant's post-
marshalling duty under the "rigorous", clearly erroneous standard: 
Once appellants have established every 
pillar supporting their adversary's position, 
they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. They must 
show the trial court's findings are "so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence', thus making them 
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'clearly erroneous'." Id., at 1053 (emphasis 
added; citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Obergs did precisely the opposite 
from marshalling—they recite and discuss only the evidence on 
which they relied at trial. They altogether ignored Hansens' 
compelling evidence supporting the denial of Obergs' frivolous 
defense of boundary by acquiescence and the award of attorney's 
fees. Indeed, Oneida might have been describing Obergs' failure of 
their duties: 
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's factual 
findings. Rather than bearing its marshaling 
burden, Oneida has merely presented carefully 
selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony 
in support of its position. Such selective 
citation to the record does not begin to 
marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than 
attempting to reargue her case before this 
court--a tactic that we reject. Id. , at 
1053(emphasis added; citations omitted). 
Obergs, as did the Oneida appellant, failed their two-
fold duty to demonstrate how the trial court found the facts from 
the evidence and why those findings contradict the weight of the 
evidence supporting the award. Id., at 1054. 
The Oneida court had no trouble affirming the district 
court without analysis of the arguments raised on appeal. 
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, we hold that those findings are 
accurate and affirm the trial court's 
dismissal based on those findings. 
As we decline to consider the merits of 
Oneida's appeal, we take the occasion to 
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further articulate our rationale behind the 
marshaling requirement. . . . 
Id., at 1053 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also, e.g., 
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Ut. App. 1992) (appellate court 
affirmed without comment because appellant failed to marshal 
evidence). 
Because of Obergs' failure to marshal the evidence, their 
challenge to Judge Mower's Findings of Fact should be dismissed 
without further consideration. "When the duty to marshal is not 
properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges 
to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Mountain States 
Broadcasting, supra, 783 P.2d 553. 
II. The Testimony and Evidence Produced at Trial Support Judge 
Mower's Findings of Fact. 
Obergs argue that their title to the disputed property 
became perfected under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
prior to the time Hansens acquired a deed to their property which 
included the disputed property. To advance this argument. 
Mr. Oberg quotes himself and then refers to only two one-line 
statements made by Mr. Robert Sevy in support of his argument. 
Obergs totally ignore the other testimony and evidence Judge Mower 
considered in arriving at his decision as set forth above in the 
summary of the testimony presented at trial. 
The elements of a boundary by acquiescence are: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
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(3) for a long period of time, (4) by 
adjoining land owners. 
Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Ut. App. 1993). 
Utah courts have always restrictively 
applied this doctrine. A party claiming title 
by acquiescence must establish all of the 
required elements to give rise to a 
presumption of ownership in his or her favor. 
Id. , at 168-169 (citations omitted) . Obergs failed to carry their 
burden of establishing at least elements (1), (2) , and (4) . Obergs 
failed to show occupation of the disputed parcel or even that the 
fence was sufficiently visible to demark any line or barrier. 
There is no showing of mutual acquiescence in the old fence line as 
a boundary line. There is no showing of why the fence was 
originally constructed or any of the use of the fence except for 
the purpose of holding livestock. The earliest evidence regarding 
the use of the fence occurred while both the Obergs' and Hansens' 
property were owned by the same owner. There is no evidence that 
any party treated the fence as a boundary line at any time in the 
past. Hansens presented evidence showing that the old fence line 
was not regarded as the property line by him or his predecessors in 
interest. Finally, because Obergs presented no evidence of any use 
of the property or the fence line prior to the 1950's, and since 
both Obergs' and Hansens' property were under common ownership 
until 1970, Obergs have failed to show an agreement as to a 
boundary between adjoining land owners over any sufficient period 
of time to constitute boundary by acquiescence. 
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In Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a finding of no boundary by acquiescence in a 
case involving a fence used to contain livestock. The Court 
stated: 
The defendants have set forth in their 
brief, only isolated parts of testimony 
favoring their contentions, emphasizing 
existence of a fence for a long time. There 
was no showing of the important continuity of 
use factor, and no proof positive of any 
mutual acquiescence that the fence was or was 
intended to be a boundary. The trial court 
reasonably could have recognized and 
apparently did recognize such insufficiency in 
the evidence. 
Id. , at 731. The Obergs failed to establish that the old fence 
line was used as a boundary or was placed to settle any uncertainty 
about the location of the boundary. The mere fact that a fence 
happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it for 
a long period of time will not establish it as the true boundary. 
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Ut. 2d 119, 121, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954). 
It is not to be questioned that if an 
owner of property puts up a fence simply as a 
barrier to separate one part of his property 
from the other, for some purpose of his own 
convenience, such as to confine animals in a 
pasture, or to keep them out of certain areas, 
such a fence is properly referred to as a 
barrier, and not as a boundary. The period of 
time that a fence exists under such circum-
stances as a barrier will not constitute part 
of the "long period of time" requisite to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence. On the 
other hand, if the property on either side of 
such a fence is conveyed to separate parties, 
so that there comes into being separate owner-
ship of the tracts on either side, and the 
circumstances are such that the party should 
reasonably be assumed to accept the fence as 
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the boundary between their properties, thence 
from that time on, the time during which the 
fence continues to exist, should be regarded 
as going toward fulfilling the time require-
ment for establishment of a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (Ut. 1974). During all the time the 
properties were in joint ownership, no boundary by acquiescence 
could accrue. Obergs failed to show circumstances in which the 
parties would reasonably be assumed to accept the fence as a 
boundary. Some owners did not even know there was a fence there. 
The Hansens' predecessors, Oscar Peterson, Jack Peterson, and 
Robert Sevy all believed that the true boundary was in or near the 
creek. They did not acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
There was evidence presented that the property of Hansens 
and Obergs was previously commonly owned or owned by closely 
related family members, and while commonly owned both parcels were 
used as one big pasture and that livestock freely roamed over the 
entire property. (Robert Sevy, Tr. 301-319); (Ted Peterson, Tr. 
348); (Wayne Sevy, Tr. 396, 399, 400). 
Obergs' own witness, Mr. Ted Peterson, testified that 
when he cleaned Cottonwood Creek in the 1940's the fence was in 
disrepair, worn out and torn down. (Tr. 351 and 352). 
In fact, there was no evidence presented by either party 
as to the purpose, intent or use of the property or the fence prior 
to 1954 when the Becks owned both parcels. 
In fact, the Court brought to a head the very question of 
acquiescence by predecessors in interest to the property at the 
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close of the trial in a discussion with Obergs' counsel (see Tr. 
440-442). Judge Mower made a finding that there has never been a 
boundary between parcels 105 and 107 that qualified as a boundary 
by acquiescence (R. 197). Further, to the extent that there may 
have been a fence or any other boundary between parcels 105 and 
107, there was no acquiescence in it by the parties to this action. 
(R. 197) . 
Obergs failed at trial to show any evidence as to the 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary by anyone. They simply 
claimed there was an old fence and it ought to be the boundary. 
They make the same claim again on appeal. Because the trial 
court's decision is amply supported by the evidence, the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
III. Judge Mower Substantively Found that Obergs' Action was 
Without Merit and Their Defense was in Bad Faith. 
In most cases, attorney's fees are awarded only if 
authorized by a statutory or contractual provision. In this case, 
although not specifically stated in the findings, the trial court 
substantively found Obergs' actions to be without merit and that 
their defense was in bad faith. There is sufficient evidence in 
the record and transcript in support of the award of attorney's 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, under which Judge 
Mower was required to award attorney's fees if Obergs' claim has no 
merit and is in bad faith. 
Oberg cites Baldwin v. Barton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) 
for the general proposition that an award of attorney's fees is 
-32-
appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract. Yet the 
Baldwin court, per Chief Justice Hall, upheld the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 76-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated, even though the trial court had not indicated a legal 
basis for its conclusion. Id., at 1198. Justice Hall went into 
the record and transcript to find the facts on which the trial 
court based its decision. 
Appellate review of a "without merit" determination is a 
question of law that will be reviewed for correctness. 
On the other hand, a "bad faith" determination is a 
question of fact and is reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut. App. 1991). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[I]n the absence 
of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent 
equitable power to award reasonable attorney's fees when it deems 
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity." Steward v. 
Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782, (Utah 1994). See 
also Jensen v. Bowcut, 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 19 (Ut. App. 1995) 
wherein the Court of Appeals per Justice Greenwood upheld an award 
of attorney's fees based on the principles of equity and justice as 
they related to the specific circumstances of that case. 
In the instant case, Obergs trespass upon the Hansens' 
property and their destruction of trees and vegetation compelled 
Hansens to bring this action. (R. 195) . 
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Obergs continued their trespass in spite of Hansens' 
protests while Mr. Hansen was out of town serving in the Utah 
National Guard. (Tr. 35, 146 and 159). 
Obergs agreed to move their fence in the future as 
Hansens developed their property. (R. 197). 
In November of 1992, Hansens' counsel sent Obergs a 
letter asking them to vacate Hansens' property, dismantle the fence 
and desist from any further interference. (R. 197). 
The fence still stood at the time of trial in this 
matter. (R. 197). 
Obergs' counsel said this whole matter was over a grudge 
between the parties and that the parties should not even be here. 
(Tr. 450) . 
There is ample evidence in the record and the transcript 
to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees, and due 
deference is owed to Judge Mower who actually presided over the 
proceeding and has firsthand familiarity with the litigation. Utah 
Dep't of Social Services v. Adams, 860 P.2d 1193 (Ut. App. 1991). 
The record also supports Judge Mower's findings that 
there is no factual or legal justification for Obergs' actions. 
Judge Mower found that "there has never been a boundary 
between parcels 105 and 107 that qualified as a boundary by 
acquiescence." (R. 197) (emphasis added). Judge Mower also found 
that "to the extent that there may have been a fence, or any other 
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boundary between parcels 105 and 107, there was no acquiescence in 
it by the parties to this action. (R. 197) (emphasis added). 
Obergs simply failed to provide evidence remotely 
sufficient to support their defense of this action on the theory of 
boundary by acquiescence. Obergs offered no proof at trial and 
cannot point to any proof on appeal. This whole appeal is Obergs' 
continuation of their grudge with Hansens over a piece of ground 
that Mr. Oberg claims has no value. (Tr. 276 and 277). 
Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees when he made his oral 
findings. (Tr. 456 and 457) . Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees 
when he drafted his own Findings of Fact and Decision. (R. 172 and 
181). Judge Mower awarded attorney's fees in the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. (R. 190 and 197) . Judge Mower awarded 
attorney's fees in the Judgment and Order that he signed. (R. 199 
and 2 00) . 
Obergs filed a Motion to Amend Judgement and a Memorandum 
in Support making the same arguments he has on appeal. (R. 182 
through 187). Judge Mower denied their motion. (R. 216). Judge 
Mower has stayed firm in his award of attorney's fees. 
Judge Mower had a firsthand look at Obergs' case, the 
facts and the evidence presented, and found that their defense of 
Hansens' actions had no basis in law or fact and therefore was 
without merit. 
The award of attorney's fees should be upheld by this 
Court, and Obergs should be assessed attorney's fees and costs on 
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this frivolous appeal, particularly in light of their total failure 
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. 
There is no evidence in the record that Obergs had an honest belief 
in their claim. Obergs intended to and did take unconscionable 
advantage of Hansens and knew this suit would cause Hansens 
monetary damage they could ill afford. (Tr. 3 94). 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence supports the Findings of Fact that Obergs 
challenge. Judge Mower correctly determined that there was never 
any acquiescence in the fence as a boundary by predecessors or by 
the parties. Judge Mower had an opportunity to see and evaluate 
the witnesses and evidence. The evidence supports Judge Mower's 
award of attorney's fees because of the meritless and bad faith 
defense by Obergs, and because of the Court's inherent equitable 
powers. 
Last but perhaps more importantly, Obergs totally failed 
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's judgment, 
thereby requiring Hansens to do so, and on that basis alone their 
appeal in its entirety should be dismissed. 
For the foregoing reasons, Hansens respectfully request 
that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court, and award 
them their costs and attorney's fees on this appeal. 
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